

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 022438

53
ORIGIN INR-07

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 EA-07 SS-15 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-04

L-03 ACDA-05 NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 DODE-00 /070 R

DRAFTED BY INR/RSE:MGODMAN; REA:EOLSEN

APPROVED BY INR/DDR:MPACKMAN

INR/RSE:PKCOOK

EUR/RPM - DJONES (INFO)

EUR/RPM - JMARESCA (INFO)

INR/REA - PBARNETT

EUR/SOV - JMONTGOMERY

----- 103977

R 291846Z JAN 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO OIC PTC -

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 022438

PASS FOLLOWING VIA THE NATO-WIDE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

RR RWFVA RWFWB RWFWD RWFWE RWFWF RWFVG RWFWH RWFVI RWFWK

RWFVL RWFWM RWFVN RWFVO RWFVP RWFVQ RWFWR RWFVZ

DE RWFWS #2438 0300400

ZNY CCCCC

R 291846Z JAN 76

FM WASHINGTON

TO AIG 6006, 6007

NATO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FROM WASHINGTON

POLITICAL ANALYSIS: GROMYKO IN JAPAN

1. THE USSR AND JAPAN MADE NO ATTEMPT TO MASK THEIR DIS-
AGREEMENTS DURING FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S VISIT TO TOKYO,
JANUARY 9-13. THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF OFFICIALS FROM BOTH

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 022438

SIDES WERE UNUSUALLY CANDID AND CRITICAL, AND TOUCHED ON
ALL OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE, MORE-
OVER, WAS BRIEF AND PERFUNCTORY.

2. THE VISIT INDICATED ONCE AGAIN THAT MOSCOW IS NOT YET PREPARED FOR A NEW POLITICAL APPROACH TO ITS PRESENTLY COOL AND PRAGMATIC RELATIONSHIP WITH TOKYO. THE JAPANESE HAVE, HOWEVER, FOR THE FIRST TIME SIGNALLED PUBLICLY A CHANGE IN THEIR FACADE OF EQUAL DISTANCE BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE PRC. THE MIKI GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE EVEN MADE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CONCLUDE THE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH

CHINA THAT HAS BEEN HANGING FIRE SINCE LAST SPRING, A MOVE THAT DE FACTO WILL PRODUCE A TILT TOWARD PEKING.

3. DIFFERENCES ARGUED PUBLICLY: FROM GROMYKO'S ARRIVAL ON, BOTH SOVIETS AND JAPANESE SEEMED DETERMINED TO ARGUE THEIR CASES IN PUBLIC. THE MESSAGE THAT THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER RECEIVED FROM PRIME MINISTER MIKI AND FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA WAS A PARTICULARLY SHARP ONE.

(A)--MIKI IMPLICITLY CONFIRMED THAT JAPAN GAVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PRC A HIGHER PRIORITY THAN ITS DEALINGS WITH THE USSR WHEN HE TERMED THE CONCEPT OF EQUAL DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO STATES A "MYTH."

(B)--HE ADDED THAT POLITICAL PRIORITIES ARE ALWAYS CHANGING AND THAT IT WAS UNREALISTIC FOR TOKYO TO TRY TO KEEP A PERFECT BALANCE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING.

(C)--MIYAZAWA, IN THE SAME VEIN, GRATUITOUSLY REMARKED THAT THE GROMYKO VISIT HAD "EVEN HELPED LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR FURTHER PROMOTING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA ON THE PEACE TREATY."

(D)--HE ALSO STRESSED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE SINCE PRIME MINISTER TANAKA'S VISIT TO THE USSR IN 1973, AND THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES HAD BEEN "EMPHASIZED FROM BEGINNING TO END" WITH GROMYKO, BUT WITHOUT "CONCRETE DEVELOPMENT."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 STATE 022438

4. DIFFERENCES SURFACED ON OTHER ISSUES AS WELL. BOTH MIKI AND MIYAZAWA WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO REBUFF MOSCOW'S ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SCHEME. GROMYKO MUST HAVE FOUND THESE REMARKS PARTICULARLY ANNOYING BECAUSE, DURING THE SAME PERIOD THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFULLY PROMOTING ASIAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, THE CHINESE HAVE MANAGED TO SIGN COMMUNIQUES CONTAINING ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSES WITH SUCH ASIAN NATIONS AS MALAYSIA, THAILAND, BURMA, CAMBODIA, AND THE PHILIPPINES. THE PROPOSED SINO-JAPANESE TREATY--APPARENTLY DESTINED TO CONTAIN A SIMILAR CLAUSE--WOULD MARK PEKING'S FIRST SUCCESS AT THAT LEVEL.

5. ANOTHER POINT OF CONTENTION IN SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS IS THAT LAST YEAR'S FISHERIES AGREEMENT BETWEEN MOSCOW AND TOKYO HAS DONE LITTLE TO STOP SOVIET HARASSMENT OF JAPANESE FISHING OPERATIONS. MIYAZAWA CALLED ON THE

SOVIETS TO EXERCISE SOME "SELF-RESTRAINT," AND MIKI REFERRED PUBLICLY TO THE "WILD ACTS" OF SOVIET FISHING BOATS. THE JAPANESE ARE ALSO RANKLED BY MOSCOW'S FAILURE THUS FAR TO NAME SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TO THE BILATERAL COMMITTEE TO ARBITRATE FISHERY DISPUTES, WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED IN OCTOBER. (THE JAPANESE MEMBERS WERE NAMED LAST YEAR.) EVEN GROMYKO'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE IMPENDING RELEASE OF 32 JAPANESE FISHERMEN DETAINED IN THE USSR LOST SOME IMPACT WHEN HE INSISTED ON NEGOTIATIONS TO ARRANGE THE TIMING AND OTHER PROCEDURAL DETAILS OF THE RELEASE.

6. GROMYKO'S RESPONSE: THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER'S REMARKS WERE LESS DIRECT THAN THE JAPANESE COMMENTS, BUT GIVEN HIS USUAL CIRCUMSPECT BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC, THEY UNDERSCORED THE KREMLIN'S FAILURE TO SEEK A NEW POLITICAL APPROACH FOR NARROWING THE CURRENT DIFFERENCES IN SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS.

(A)--GROMYKO BLUNTLY WARNED THAT IT WOULD BE "NECESSARY TO REVIEW RELATIONS" IF THE SINO-JAPANESE TREATY INCLUDES AN ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE.

(B)--HE REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 STATE 022438

PUBLICLY AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD "DIFFERENT VIEWS" ON THAT PROBLEM. (MIKI DESCRIBED GROMYKO AS "ADAMANTLY" REFUSING TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION AT ALL.)

(C)--GROMYKO WOULD NOT EVEN ACKNOWLEDGE PUBLICLY THE LONG-STANDING JAPANESE INVITATION TO THE TOP THREE SOVIET LEADERS TO VISIT TOKYO, ALTHOUGH HE COMMENTED PRIVATELY THAT BREZHNEV WOULD "STUDY THE VISIT PROBLEM CONCRETELY AFTER NEXT MONTH'S PARTY CONGRESS." (MIKI, IN TURN, REFUSED GROMYKO'S INVITATION TO COME TO MOSCOW BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET FAILURE THUS FAR TO REPAY PRIME MINISTER TANAKA'S VISIT THERE IN 1973.)

7. JUST BEFORE LEAVING TOKYO, GROMYKO ATTACKED PEKING'S STAND ON THE ANTI-HEGEMONY ISSUE AND AGAIN WARNED THE JAPANESE NOT TO SIDE WITH THE PRC AGAINST MOSCOW. WHEN TOKYO SEEMED READY TO SIGN THE PEACE TREATY LAST YEAR, MOSCOW EXERTED STRONG PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRESSURE ON JAPAN. WHEN THESE TACTICS ANTAGONIZED THE JAPANESE, THE SOVIETS TEMPERED THEIR APPROACH. MOSCOW'S SOFT SELL CONTINUED UNTIL THE GROMYKO VISIT LOOMED.

8. MIKI, WHO REPORTEDLY WAS OFFENDED BY GROMYKO'S UNCOM-PROMISING APPROACH, DEFENDED THE ANTI-HEGEMONY PRINCIPLE IN TERMS THAT ALIGNED JAPANESE VIEWS WITH THOSE EXPRESSED

IN THE US-PRC SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OF 1972 AND, SHORTLY AFTER GROMYKO LEFT JAPAN, REMARKED THAT TOKYO WOULD WORK TO CONCLUDE A TREATY WITH PEKING "AS SOON AS PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE," DESPITE SOVIET OBJECTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, HE MUST STILL CONTEND WITH OPPOSITION IN HIS OWN PARTY.

9. COMMUNIQUE DODGES DIFFERENCES: FOLLOWING THREE NIGHTS OF "TERRIBLE POLEMICS," ACCORDING TO A JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCE, THE PARTIES MANAGED TO PRODUCE A BRIEF AND PERfunctory COMMUNIQUE. THE STATEMENT OMITTED ANY SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, AND ALSO DODGED THE FISHERIES ISSUE AND THE INVITATION TO BREZHNEV TO VISIT TOKYO. ONE NOTEWORTHY DIFFERENCE IN THE RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE VERSIONS OF THE COMMUNIQUE PARTICULARLY REFLECTED MOSCOW'S CONTINUING OPPOSITION TO TOKYO'S VIEW
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 05 STATE 022438

THAT THE TERRITORIES ISSUE MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE A PEACE TREATY COULD BE CONCLUDED. THE JAPANESE TEXT CLEARLY LINKED THE TWO ISSUES WITH THE FORMULATION THAT: "BOTH SIDES, RECOGNIZING THAT CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY, BY RESOLVING THE VARIOUS PROBLEMS THAT HAVE BEEN LEFT UNRESOLVED SINCE WWII, WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS...." THE SOVIET VERSION, HOWEVER, SEPARATED THE PEACE TREATY FROM BI-LATERAL PROBLEMS (I.E., THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE) REMAINING FROM THE WAR: "...RECOGNIZING THAT SETTLEMENT OF THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES REMAINING FROM WWII AND CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY, WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS...."

10. THE COMMUNIQUE DID, HOWEVER, RECORD THE VISIT'S TWO MODEST SUCCESSES. MIYAZAWA ACCEPTED A SOVIET INVITATION TO VISIT THE USSR THIS YEAR, "TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS FOR CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY," AND BOTH SIDES AGREED TO EXTEND THEIR CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT FOR ANOTHER TWO YEARS.

11. ASSESSMENT: GROMYKO'S HEAVY-HANDED APPROACH WITH THE JAPANESE MAY HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY MOSCOW'S VIEW THAT MIKI CURRENTLY HAS A NARROW BASE OF POLITICAL SUPPORT AND IS OUT IN FRONT OF HIS OWN PARTY IN PUSHING FOR A PEACE TREATY WITH THE PRC. MIKI DEPENDS ON THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S RIGHT WING, THE ONE ELEMENT MOST OPPOSED TO MAKING ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS TO THE CHINESE. THE SOVIETS MAY FIND, HOWEVER, THAT GROMYKO'S HARD STAND MAY

PUSH JAPAN CLOSER TO THE PRC. TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS COMES TO PASS, THE SOVIET POLICY WAS CLEARLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

12. THE GROMYKO VISIT ALSO INDICATED THAT THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE NOT ONLY PRECLUDES THE SIGNING OF A PEACE TREATY BUT IS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO ANY IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS. IN THE SHORT RUN, THE JAPANESE HAVE NOW MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO BE CONSTRAINED BY THE HIGHER PRIORITY GIVEN TO RELATIONS WITH THE PRC. MIKI NOTED, IN COMMENDING ON THE GROMYKO TALKS, THAT IT WAS UNREALISTIC FOR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 06 STATE 022438

TOKYO TO TRY TO MAINTAIN PERFECT BALANCE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING.

13. TOKYO WILL CONTINUE TO LIMIT ITS PARTICIPATION IN SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, IN ORDER TO AVOID GIVING PEKING GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT. THE ROLE OF US FINANCING FOR SIBERIAN PROJECTS INVOLVING TOKYO IS AN ADDITIONAL COMPLICATING FACTOR IN SOVIET-JAPANESE DEALINGS IN THE NEAR TERM. IN ANY EVENT, NO NEW SOVIET-JAPANESE ECONOMIC PROJECTS ARE NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION, NOR DID THE GROMYKO VISIT RESULT IN SPEEDING UP THE OLD ONES. KISSINGER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 15 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, MINISTERIAL VISITS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 29 JAN 1976
Decapton Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decapton Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: morefirh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE022438
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: INR/RSE:MG GOODMAN; REA:EOLSEN
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D760036-0049
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760199/baaaeoax.tel
Line Count: 247
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN INR
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: morefirh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 05 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <05 MAY 2004 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <17 MAY 2004 by morefirh>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> srp 970917
Subject: POLITICAL ANALYSIS: GROMYKO IN JAPAN
TAGS: PFOR, JA, UR, (GROMYKO, ANDREY ANDREYEVICH)
To: OIC PTC - INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006